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Abstract 
The Air Force relies on the application of new technologies to support and 
execute its mission.  As new technologies develop, the integration of that technology is 
studied to determine the costs and benefits it may provide to the war fighter.  One such 
emergent technology is the Bluetooth wireless protocol, used to connect a small number 
of devices over a short distance.  The short distance is a feature that makes using the 
protocol desirable.  However short, there is still a vulnerability to interception.   
This research identifies ranges at which several commercially available Bluetooth 
devices are usable.  Various combinations of both distance and orientation are varied to 
determine a 360 degree map of the Bluetooth antenna.  The map identifies distances at 
which certain throughput thresholds are available.  This research shows that baseline 1 
mW Bluetooth antennas are capable of throughput levels of 100 kbps at over 40 meters, 
which is four times the minimum distance specified in the protocol standard. 
The 3Com PC card was the best performing PC card, capable of throughputs at or 
near 100 kbps out to 40 meters.  The other PC Cards tested had similar performance.  The 
Hawking USB dongle was the best USB antenna tested, achieving throughputs of over 
200 kbps in three of the four orientation, and over 150 kbps at the fourth.  The 3Com 
dongle was a close second, the Belkin dongle a distant third, while the DLink antenna 
was not able to achieve 100 kbps at any distance tested.
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THROUGHPUT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF 
UNMODIFIED BLUETOOTH DEVICES 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 More so than the other services, the Air Force relies on the application of new 
technologies to support and execute its mission.  As new technologies develop, the 
possible integration of that technology is studied to determine the costs and benefits it 
may provide to the war fighter.  One such emergent technology is the Bluetooth wireless 
system. 
 Bluetooth is a wireless computing protocol designed to integrate devices within a 
Personal Area Network (PAN).  Created as a cable replacement technology, Bluetooth 
allows devices to communicate with one another wirelessly, eliminating the need for 
vendor specific cables and adapters.  Being an open and public standard, Bluetooth can 
be incorporated by any manufacturer who wants to communicate with other devices 
wirelessly.    
1.2 Background 
 As with any communications system, one of the chief concerns is the security of 
the system.  When using a wireless communications system, the primary cause for 
security concerns are the possibility of signal interception by outside parties or 
unauthorized access of the system.  While Bluetooth is designed to operate as a short 
range protocol, it is still vulnerable within that range. 
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 Bluetooth implements many techniques to mitigate the possibility of interception, 
including frequency hopping and varying levels of encryption.  Despite these efforts, it is 
still susceptible to attack.  One way to eliminate the threat from outsiders is to field the 
system where the range of the network is enclosed within a secure area.  To do so the 
transmission capabilities of Bluetooth must be determined.   
1.3 Research Focus 
The goal of this research is to determine the actual throughput capabilities of 
commercially available Bluetooth devices.  By studying the performance of several 
antennas at varied distances and orientations, the performance can be generalized to an 
understanding of the capabilities of the Bluetooth wireless system as a whole.   
 The objective of this research is to develop a usability/vulnerability map for 
general Bluetooth devices.  Identifying the distances and orientations for specific 
throughput levels will show both the capability of the Bluetooth system, as well as the 
range of possible signal exploitation. 
 To realize this objective, a study of the published material concerning the 
Bluetooth system and its performance forms a foundation for the research.  With this 
knowledge, experiments are designed and conducted to determine the performance of 
assorted Bluetooth antennas.  From that data a usability map is created to graphically 
display the capabilities of each system.  Finally, results are compared to form a 
generalization of Bluetooth performance. 
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1.4 Summary 
 This study determines the capabilities of general, commercial Bluetooth systems, 
as an extension of the research conducted in [11].  The remainder of this document is 
organized as follows:  Chapter 2 presents the relevant background on wireless computing, 
the Bluetooth standard, wireless security, and Bluetooth specific security issues.  Chapter 
3 details the experimental methodology guiding this research.  Chapter 4 provides the 
results of the experiments and the analysis of that data.  Finally Chapter 5 summarizes the 
research and discusses conclusions drawn from it. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter contains the background information on Bluetooth communication 
devices.  This chapter’s information mirrors and extends previous work of [11].  It 
includes discussions of wireless computer communications, Bluetooth specific 
communications, wireless security issues, and Bluetooth specific security concerns. 
2.2 Wireless Computer Communications 
 Wireless computer communications use electromagnetic radio waves to transmit 
information through the air.  The signal’s bandwidth capacity is a function of the 
frequency at which the antenna transmits.  The higher the frequency of the signal, the 
larger the data load the signal can carry.  However the higher capacity frequencies have a 
cost, namely the signal is more vulnerable to interference from atmospheric conditions.  
The choice of transmission frequencies is not completely open, as international and 
governmental agencies regulate frequency usage and allocation.  In the United States, 
frequency usage is managed by the Federal Communication Commission. 
2.2.1 Wireless Network Compositions 
 As the use of wireless communications has matured, it has evolved into several 
families of networks based upon the size and range of the network:  local area networks 
(LAN), personal area networks (PAN), and metropolitan area networks (MAN). 
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2.2.2 Local Area Networks 
 Local area networks had their genesis in both industry and academia, possibly 
being the most researched topic in recent wireless communications.  Wireless LANs have 
allowed business and students to be mobile within a campus area while still maintaining 
connectivity to the network.  With laptops becoming a more popular platform in 
computing, mobile connectivity continues to grow in popularity.  The ability of wireless 
technologies to achieve comparable data rates with wired networks has also fueled its 
acceptance.   
2.2.3 The IEEE 802.11 Protocol Family 
 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has developed the 
802.11 family of specifications for wireless local area networks.  All of the specifications 
in the 802.11 family “use the Ethernet protocol and CSMA/CA (carrier sense multiple 
access with collision avoidance) for path sharing” [10]. 
802.11 was the first protocol in this family, formally specified in 1997 by IEEE.  
Using phase shift keying modulation, it broadcasts in the 2.4 GHz unlicensed ISM 
(Industrial, Scientific, and Medical) band using either Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum (FHSS) or Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS).  This standard specified 
a data rate of 1 to 2 Mbps on the network. 
The 802.11a protocol “applies to wireless ATM systems and is used in access 
hubs. 802.11a operates at radio frequencies between 5 GHz and 6 GHz. It uses a 
modulation scheme known as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) that 
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makes possible data speeds as high as 54 Mbps, but most commonly, communications 
takes place at 6 Mbps, 12 Mbps, or 24 Mbps” [10]. 
The 802.11b standard is a backward compatible improvement upon the original 
802.11.  Also referred to as ‘Wi-Fi,’ 802.11b is the most common wireless protocol in 
commercial use today.  It provides data rates of up to 11 Mbps, operating in the 2.4 GHz 
band.  It modulates using complementary code keying (CCK) and broadcasts using 
DSSS. 
The 802.11e standard was developed to provide a better level of Quality of 
Service (QoS) to the 802.11 family of protocols.  The target of this standard is delay-
sensitive applications, such as Voice over IP (VoIP) or other streaming data. 
802.11g is the newest standard in the family, focusing on improving the data rates 
of 802.11b up to 54 Mbps in the same range as 802.11b.  Like its predecessor, it also 
transmits in the 2.4 GHz band. 
2.2.4 Personal Area Networks 
 The scope of a PAN is limited to a single office setting.  PANs integrate low 
power devices within an office setting such as laptops, personal digital assistants (PDA), 
digital cameras, and other small digital devices.  Using a common wireless solution, 
personal area networks can communicate without integrating various manufacturer cards, 
wires, and plugs to connect these items. 
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2.2.5 The IEEE 802.15 Protocol Family 
 IEEE 802.15.1 is the initial standard for wireless PAN implementation and the 
first in the 802.15 family.  It is based on the Bluetooth v1.1 specification, which transmits 
in the 2.4 GHz band at rates up to 1 Mbps. 
 The 802.15.3 provides high data rates (20 Mbps and above) in the PAN arena 
while operating with low power, as a low cost solution. 
 802.15.4 differs from other standards in the family by providing a low bandwidth, 
personal area solution, with data rates near 20 kbps, 40 kbps, and 250 kbps.  Like 
802.15.3, it also focuses on “extra-low power MAC and physical layers” [15]. 
2.2.6 Metropolitan Area Networks and 802.16 
 Metropolitan Area Networks seek to connect both smaller LANs to larger 
networks and the Internet, as well as connect individual users.  The goal is to wirelessly 
connect networks at ranges up to and beyond thirty miles.  The 802.16 specification for 
Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) is still under development, but has several 
objectives. 
The first is a wireless solution for replacing T1 lines in large areas.  Many 
businesses have to wait for these lines to be installed in their buildings.  A long-range, 
high bandwidth wireless solution could replace the need for expensive T1 lines, allowing 
much quicker access to high speed connections.   
The next focus is on consumer network connectivity, that is cable-based 
connections and digital subscriber lines (DSL).  A high rate wireless connection could 
help solve availability problems seen in this market.   
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Finally, a sub-group of the 802.16 committee is investigating mobile metropolitan 
connections: allowing individual users to remain connected to city wide networks as they 
travel within the MAN’s broadcast range. 
2.2.7 Transmission Methods 
 There are several different methods by which information can be transmitted over 
wireless networks.  Each way has its set of benefits over the other methods, but also 
comes with its own deficiencies. 
2.2.7.1 Narrow Band Radio 
 Narrow band radio transmissions occur within a specific frequency range.  The 
transmitter and receiver are tuned to the same frequency and stay there for the duration of 
the connection.  Because the signal is broadcast on that frequency, the possibility of 
interception and interference is high. 
2.2.7.2 Spread Spectrum 
 Signals transmitted using spread spectrum broadcast the data across a large span 
of frequencies.  Spread spectrum broadcasts are implemented using either Direct 
Sequence Spread Spectrum or Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum. 
2.2.7.2.1 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
 In a direct sequence approach, each bit is spread over and transmitted on multiple 
frequencies.  “Spread spectrum broadcasts in bands where noise is prominent, but does 
not rise above the noise” [14].  The data is spread across the frequencies based on a 
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pseudorandom key generated to modulate the data stream.  That bit stream must be 
known by both parties, so they can both transmit and demodulate the signal. 
2.2.7.2.2 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
 Unlike direct sequenced broadcasts, frequency hopping transmissions are sent on 
only one frequency at a time.  However, they differ from narrow band transmissions, 
because the frequency changes multiple times over a given time period.  Both the 
transmitter and receivers must be synchronized to the same hopping pattern to 
communicate.  This reduces the chance of interference or interception by a third party. 
2.3 Bluetooth 
 To “develop and promote a global solution for short-range wireless 
communication operating in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz ISM band,” [4] Ericsson, IBM, Intel, 
Nokia, and Toshiba joined to form the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) in late 
1998.  To better market this technology, the SIG opted to make the specification open 
and royalty free, encouraging other companies to adopt it as a short range wireless 
solution. 
 The name Bluetooth comes from “the Danish King Harald Blatand (Bluetooth),” 
[3]. It was chosen because he is believed to have united the people of Denmark and 
Norway during the 10th Century.  In that spirit of unity, Bluetooth was developed as a 
short-range network protocol designed to unite all the devices within a PAN.   
 The first version of the specification was made publicly available in the summer 
of 1999.  The adopter members had access to the specification before it was made public, 
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so despite its seemingly initial incompleteness, there were working devices implementing 
the Bluetooth standard just as the documentation hit the public.  The promoter group has 
grown since its inception to the size of nine, with 3Com, Lucent, Microsoft, and Motorola 
joining in late 1999.  The adopter group has also grown to over 3000 companies 
worldwide, who have developed hundreds of Bluetooth devices.  The specification is 
currently in version 1.1, with two distinct parts:  “[t]he core specification  defining the 
radio characteristics and the communication protocols for exchanging data between 
devices over Bluetooth radio links,” [3] and “[t]he profile specification that defines how 
the Bluetooth protocols are to be used to realize a number of selected applications” [3]. 
The Bluetooth standard was developed to replace the vendor and protocol specific 
cables that run between different personal devices, such as PDAs, cellular phones, digital 
cameras, laptop computers, and other devices.  Many of these devices have unique 
connectors that make integration a nightmare in a personal area network.  Bluetooth 
hopes to eliminate the need for these connectors, by utilizing a common, open wireless 
standard to create these connections. 
Devices adhering to the Bluetooth standard transmit in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, 
“employing frequency-hopping (FH) spread spectrum technology to reduce interference 
and fading” [16].  A time division duplex scheme is implemented, allowing for full 
duplex communications in a wireless personal area network, known as a piconet.  A 
single piconet can support eight devices:  one master and up to seven slaves.  Bluetooth 
piconets can support asynchronous data links with each slave device and synchronous 
voice links with up to three slaves.  The published range of a piconet is 10m when 
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transmitting at 1 mw EIRP.  That range can be increased to 100m by increasing the 
transmission power.  Bluetooth devices support transmissions on these links at rates up to 
1 Mbps. 
The ISM frequency band ranges from 2.400 MHz to 2483.5 MHz in most 
countries.  Bluetooth operates in the 2402 MHz to 2480 MHz RF channels.  Each channel 
in the range is 1 MHz wide, giving Bluetooth 79 channels in which to transmit.  
“Bluetooth radio hops from channel to channel at 1600 hops per second,” [16] giving the 
network time slots of 625 microseconds.  The sequence used in a piconet is unique to that 
piconet, being “determined using an algorithm based on the address (and clock) of the 
Bluetooth hub (master)” [16].  This hopping sequence is obtained by a slave once it has 
synchronized with the master of the piconet. 
Bluetooth radios modulate using a binary system of Gaussian Frequency Shift 
Keying.  It is utilized because of the better efficiency it provides above normal Frequency 
Key Shifting.  This aids the device in maintaining the proper signal characteristics for 
Bluetooth transmissions.  A simple comparison of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11b can be 
seen in Table 1. 
2.3.1 Protocols 
 There are two categories of protocols in the Bluetooth protocol stack:  transport 
protocols and middleware protocols.  These are not defined in the specification, but rather 
are natural groupings of the protocol stack.  The protocols in the transport group are 
“developed exclusively for the Bluetooth wireless technology” [3].  All protocols 
transmitting over a Bluetooth link access these protocols to communicate.  Middleware 
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protocols are those which support other protocols and applications, allowing old and new 
applications to use Bluetooth links to communicate, without knowledge of how the link 
itself works.  This widens the area in which Bluetooth can be applied.  This also allows 
“many applications already developed by vendors [to] take immediate advantage of 
hardware and software systems which are compliant to the (Bluetooth) specification” 
[12].  A diagram of the Bluetooth protocol stack is shown in Figure 1. 
Table 1.  IEEE 802.11 – Bluetooth comparison [16] 
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Figure 1.  Bluetooth Protocol Stack [3] 
2.3.2 Transport Protocols 
2.3.2.1 Radio Layer 
 This layer is discussed in the preceding sections. 
2.3.2.2 Baseband Layer 
 The essential, low level functions of a Bluetooth piconet are defined by the 
baseband layer.  It controls the physical radio link of the device, piconet formation, 
transmission resource sharing, and low level packet types.  The creation of piconets is 
managed in this layer through an inquiry and paging procedure that “synchronize[s] the 
transmission hopping frequency” [12]. 
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 For two Bluetooth devices to communicate, each must know two things:  the 
other’s Bluetooth device’s address (BD_ADDR) and the master device’s clock.  The 
BD_ADDR is a unique 48 bit address that is imprinted when the device is manufactured.  
The BD_ADDR is “engraved on the Bluetooth hardware and it cannot be modified” [3].  
The clock in each device is a 28 bit counter.  The counter is incremented every 312.5 
microseconds, “which corresponds to half the residence time in a frequency when the 
radio hops at the nominal rate of 1,600 hops/sec” [3].  Once a device knows these two 
pieces of data, it can communicate with the master and its piconet. 
2.3.2.3 Piconet Formation 
 Bluetooth piconets exist in a truly ad hoc environment; there is no set 
infrastructure for the piconet.  The duration of a piconet’s existence is defined by the 
network’s master and how long it deems a connection is necessary.  Any given Bluetooth 
device “may serve either as master or slave at different times” [3].  Even though a piconet 
is comprised of up to seven slave devices, more than the seven slaves may be present 
within the physical range of the piconet.  Those devices present but not active in the 
piconet are considered parked.  Once a device has joined as a slave in a piconet, it may 
negotiate with the master to become the new master. 
 The master of a piconet assigns a locally unique active member address 
(AM_ADDR) to each active slave in the piconet.  Those devices with the operating 
range, but not active (i.e., in parked mode) and those outside the operating range (stand-
by mode) do not have AM_ADDRs.  With this address, the master controls transmissions 
in the piconet.  Two or more piconets may “exist in time and space independent of each 
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other” [3].  In fact, a single device may be a slave in more than one piconet at a time.  
The resulting topology is known as a scatternet.  A Bluetooth device can accomplish this, 
provided its transmission slots from its first piconet do not overlap with its transmission 
slots in its second, and subsequent, piconets.  An example of Bluetooth devices in a 
scatternet formation is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Bluetooth scatternet [3] 
 
The devices in a piconet communicate by monitoring the sequence of frequency 
hops, synchronized with one another.  The time slot in which each device transmits is 625 
microseconds, which corresponds to 1600 hops/sec.  Transmissions must begin and end 
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within that time slot.  The exception to this rule is for “long packets,” which can take 
three or five slots each.  The hopping sequence is suspended during these transmissions, 
and then restarted where it would have been if only single slot packets were transmitted. 
 This frequency hopping sequence is based upon the master’s BM_ADDR and 
clock.  The master’s clock identifies the frequency currently transmitting.  Knowing these 
pieces of information, a slave can construct the hopping sequence for the piconet.  
Because it is the identifier for the piconet’s hopping sequence, a master device can only 
exist in its own piconet, even when its slaves are in a scatternet formation. 
 The slaves in a piconet are synchronized by the master’s clock.  Each slave 
determines and stores “the offset time between their own Bluetooth clock and that of their 
master” [3] to keep synchronized to the master.  The clock ticks twice per time slot, so 
the slot is determined by the second least significant bit.  This bit classifies the time slot 
as even or odd, which determines whether it is the master’s or a slave’s turn to transmit. 
 This time division duplex (TDD) system alternates transmission authority 
between the master and slaves.  “The master transmits on the even number slots…, while 
the slaves transmit on odd number slots” [3].  A slave must be contacted by the master in 
order to transmit in the piconet.  Once the master has initiated contact, the slave may 
transmit in the next time slot.  Any Bluetooth device can only transmit in one piconet at 
any given time, although deconflicted time slots may be used by devices to participate in 
several piconets. 
 Admission to a piconet is also controlled by the master.  There is a two step 
process which the master uses to finds new devices (inquiry) and allow devices into the 
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piconet (paging).  The master broadcasts an inquiry message within its transmission 
range to inform other Bluetooth devices of its presence.  If any of those devices are 
running an inquiry scan (looking for a master in discovery mode), they respond with a 
packet containing that device’s BD_ADDR. 
 Once informed of the willing devices available, the master explicitly invites 
devices to join the piconet by paging.  During this transaction, the master gives the new 
slave the hopping sequence information along with the slave’s AM_ADDR.  If the master 
has prior knowledge of devices near it, then it may bypass the inquiry phase and just page 
those nearby components. 
2.3.2.4 Connection Types 
 Bluetooth piconets allow both synchronous and asynchronous communications 
between its devices.  The asynchronous connectionless (ACL) links are used for data 
traffic when the integrity of the data is important.  The integrity is maintained “using 
retransmissions and sequence numbers, as well as forward error correction (FEC) if 
necessary” [3].  For synchronous traffic, up to three synchronous connection-oriented 
(SCO) links can be created in a piconet.  SCO links are used primarily for supporting 
“periodic audio transmissions at 64 Kb/s in each direction” [3].  The integrity of these 
transmissions is slightly less, because retransmissions do not occur over SCO links.  
However, FEC mechanisms are used to recover from some identified errors.   
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2.3.2.5 Baseband Packets 
  There are five baseband packet types:  Identification (ID), POLL/NULL, 
Frequency Hopping Sequence (FHS), ACL/SCO, and Data Voice (DV) packets as seen in 
Figure 3.  Each packet type begins with “an access code (AC) field, which is used to 
distinguish transmissions in different piconets” [3].  Except for the ID packet, all of the 
packet types also contain a header block.  The FHS, ACL/SCO, and DV packets contain a 
payload section. 
 The ID packet type is used during inquiry searches and synchronizations.  The 
POLL packet is used when a slave needs to be contacted, but there is no payload to be 
delivered.  The NULL packet type acts as a response when no payload is returned to the 
master.  The FHS packet type is used during piconet creation, by which the master passes 
the appropriate BD_ADDR, AM_ADDR, and clock information to the new slave.  The 
ACL packet type is used to pass asynchronous data.  The SCO packet type is used to pass 
synchronous data.  The DV packet type contains both ACL and SCO data, to be used 
when a SCO link also needs ACL type data transferred. 
Each packet type contains multiple fields.  The AM_ADDR field is used to 
identify “the destination slave of a master transmission or the source slave of a slave 
transmission” [3].  A Bluetooth master can broadcast messages to all of its slaves by 
setting the AM_ADDR to b’000’.  The PDU_type field identifies the baseband packet 
type in which it is contained.  The flags field is used in ACL packets to do flow control 
and retransmissions, using “a stop-and-go ARQ scheme and a 1-bit sequence number” 
[4].  The HEC provides a means to protect this header from errors in transit.   
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Figure 3.  Baseband packet types [3] 
 The ACL payload is further decomposed into a header, a body, and a 16 bit CRC.  
The header has a logical channel field (L_CH) which routes the packet through the low 
levels of the protocol stack.  When L_CH = b’11’, the packet is used by the link manager 
to configue the piconet.  When L_CH=b’01’ or b’10’, then L2CAP receives the packet. 
2.3.2.6 Link Manager Protocol 
 The Link Manager Protocol (LMP) is a transactional protocol, responsible for 
setting up the properties of and controlling the Bluetooth link, to include authentication 
and encryption of the link.  Bluetooth devices in a piconet can “authenticate another 
device through a challenge/response mechanism” [3], allowing the link to be encrypted 
once the connection is deemed authentic.  The LMPs are responsible for negotiating 
amongst themselves, to determine which device provides what services.   
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 LMP packets are transmitted in the ACL packet format.  They are identified as 
such by the logical channel L_CH set to b’11’ as seen in Figure 4.  The LMP packet 
header is 8 bits long, with the first bit determining the packets sender.  The transaction 
identifier (tr_ID) is ‘0,’ the master sent the packet.  If the tr_ID is ‘1,’ then a slave sent 
the packet. 
 
Figure 4.  LMP packet type [3] 
Authentication and encryption of Bluetooth connections is the responsibility of 
the LMP.  The authentication protocol can be initiated by either device at any time during 
communication.  The authentication procedure is “a challenge/response mechanism based 
on a commonly shared secret, a link key generated through a user-provided PIN” [3].  
The process is begun by the challenger sending a challenge packet, which contains a 
random number.  The claimant receives that packet and generates a response using a 128-
bit authentication key.  The claimant responds with the new number, where the 
challenger compares it to an expected result.  A match confirms the identity of the 
claimant.  
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 Once devices have authenticated, the encryption process may begin.  Encryption 
on piconets covers both ACL and SCO links.  Authenticated Bluetooth links generate a 
series of encryption keys from link key.  These keys are controlled by the LMP, but 
SAFER+ algorithm is used in the baseband to encrypt the data.  Along with the device’s 
Bluetooth address and the master’s clock, these keys are used to encrypt the body of the 
Bluetooth packets.  This encryption runs in 3 modes.  Mode 1 consists of no security at 
all.  Mode 2 runs application level security/encryption of packets.  Mode 3 hardware 
encrypts all traffic on link from the time the link is established. 
 The low power modes (sniff, hold, and park) of Bluetooth devices are controlled 
with LMP transactions.  Sniff mode is when a Bluetooth device listens periodically for 
master transmissions per an agreement between the two devices.  This agreement is 
decided through LMP interactions.  Hold mode is a temporary pause in a slave’s 
involvement in a piconet.  This mode is activated when “a device agrees with its [master] 
to remain silent for a given amount of time” [3].  During this pause, the slave device still 
maintains its AM_ADDR. 
 In park mode, the AM_ADDR is surrendered by the slave.  The slave remains 
silent until informed it can return to the piconet by the master device.  A parked device 
may negotiate to return to the piconet prior to being invited back by the master.  This is 
accomplished by replying to the master’s beacon transmissions.  Despite being in a low 
power mode, the Bluetooth device can still perform operations.  Low power modes only 
affect a particular piconet.  If the device is in a scatternet configuration, it can be active in 
one piconet and in a low power mode in another. 
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2.3.2.7 Host Controller Interface 
 The Host Controller Interface (HCI) is an abstraction layer in a Bluetooth device, 
not a protocol itself.  Through the HCI, a host device communicates with its Bluetooth 
baseband layer.  The HCI is “an interface for host devices to access the lower layers of 
the Bluetooth stack through a standardized interface” [3].  Through this interface, a host 
device can request to connect to a specific Bluetooth device, activate low power modes, 
initiate authentication, and other functions of the device.  The capabilities of the 
Bluetooth card are limited to the HCI command set to which the host device has access. 
2.3.2.8 Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol 
 To further abstract the hardware implementation details from the host device, the 
Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) exists just above the Host 
Controller Interface.  “The concepts of master and slave devices” no longer exist at the 
L2CAP level in the protocol stack [3].  The multiple channels of ACL links are 
multiplexed through the L2CAP layer for master devices.  SCO links do not interact with 
the L2CAP, but rather are passed straight to the baseband layer. 
 L2CAP packets are often larger than the packet sizes supported by the lower 
levels.  To account for this possible discrepancy, the L2CAP layer supports segmentation 
of its own packets.  If the packet is segmented, the L_CH field in the ACL_pkt_hdr is set 
to b’10’, identifying the packet as the first in the segmentation.  In all following packets 
in that segmentation, the ACL_pkt_hdr is set to b’01’.  L2CAP payloads can be 
configured as a signaling packet, a connection oriented payload, or a connectionless 
payload. 
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2.3.3 Middleware Protocols 
2.3.3.1 Service Directory Protocol 
 Bluetooth was created to be wide-ranging wireless enabling standard with the 
ability to cover a large number of applications.  To determine what applications or 
services a device can offer, Bluetooth provides the Service Directory Protocol (SDP).  
Through the SDP, devices can poll one another to establish which devices have what 
services to offer.  The SDP does not provide the services itself; rather it is only a provider 
of information. 
2.3.3.2 Radio Frequency Communication 
 To support serial communications protocols, Bluetooth devices have an 
RFCOMM emulator.  The RFCOMM “emulates RS-232 control and data signals over the 
Bluetooth baseband” [12], emulating the ETSI 07.10 serial specification.  With this 
middleware protocol, Bluetooth devices can support legacy serial communication 
applications without modifications of the legacy system. 
2.3.3.3 Telephony Control Signaling 
 The Telephony Control Signaling (TCS) middleware protocol allows Bluetooth to 
access telephone applications.  It consists of two command sets: the AT set (TCS-AT) 
and the binary set (TCS-BIN).  The AT command set is run through RFCOMM, being a 
serial command set.  The same commands can also control mobile phones and modems.  
The TCS-BIN command set is a binary encoding run on top of L2CAP, supporting 
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“normal telephony control functions such as placing and terminating a call, and sensing 
ring tones” [3].  TCS-BIN can also control broadcast, point-to-multipoint signals. 
2.3.3.4 Adopted Protocols 
 Bluetooth also includes support for other common protocols, such as TCP/IP.  
Given this support for current and legacy applications, Bluetooth proves to be a flexible 
and formidable wireless communications standard. 
2.3.4 Bluetooth Performance 
 Several studies have been conducted since the release of the Bluetooth 
specification seeking to evaluate and improve the technology and its capabilities.  These 
studies have varied from antenna design and manufacturing [2] [18], to field environment 
tests [1], and performance analysis of the Bluetooth channel [9] [13] [17].   
 The Bluetooth specification shows that the selection of packet types greatly 
affects the throughput capabilities of Bluetooth communications.  This variability is 
shown in Table 2.  The Bluetooth devices determine the type of packets used in 
transmission based on a determination of the signal strength.  Weaker signals outside the 
“golden range” of the device use packet types of smaller size and greater error correction.  
Stronger signals use packets of greater size and less error correction, on the presumption 
that the better signal is less likely to create errors.  Studies have found throughput 
performance correlations between packet selection and both signal to noise ratio [17] and 
bit error rate [9]. 
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Table 2.  Packet type throughput variations [4] 
 
 
 The throughput rates shown in Table 2 are maximums, assuming no 
retransmissions or uncorrectable errors in the system.  The Bluetooth specification 
requires that the signal be receivable at ten meters.  Throughput levels in excess of 300 
kbps are possible at twenty meters and 200 kbps at thirty meters [11]. 
2.4 Wireless Security Issues 
 As in any trusted environment, the security of a computer network is an important 
factor in its design and implementation.  The main areas of concern when securing a 
network are the authentication of the users, the availability of the network, and the 
confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of the data.   
• The authentication of users on a network ensures that only those people who 
should be on the network are on the network.  Unauthorized access to a trusted 
network could enable an enemy to access sensitive information and/or systems. 
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• Availability of a network ensures that when the user needs the resources of the 
network, he can access them.  Not only is the network available during normal 
usage, but also is survivable when under external stress, such as in a denial of 
service attack. 
• Confidentiality of a network is necessary for the users to trust the system and one 
another.  Without it, the data passed on the network may be acquired by 
unauthorized users. 
• Integrity of the network’s data ensures that the information has not been 
corrupted.  Maintaining the integrity of the data involves both defending against 
malicious attacks as well as dealing with accidental failures of the system. 
• Non-repudiation of the network’s messages ensures that what happens on a 
network cannot be erased.  A user sending a message cannot deny that the 
message was sent.  This gives accountability to the system. 
   Computer networks operating in a wireless environment pose several security 
threats inherent to the transmission medium.  The first of these is interference.  A simple 
understanding of what transmission scheme is being used would allow an enemy to 
execute an effective jamming operation, denying access to the network.  While spread 
spectrum technologies mitigate the likelihood of this, they do not defend against it 
completely. 
 Another vulnerability inherent to a wireless medium is signal interception, or 
eavesdropping.  Unlike a traditional wired network where the transmission lines are 
fixed, a wireless network broadcasts over an area correlated to the transmitter’s power 
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level.  Any receiver in the coverage area can receive the signal.  If the signal is not 
properly secured, an enemy could passively listen to the transmissions violating the 
network’s confidentiality.  Through various active attacks on the wireless network, an 
enemy could violate the network’s availability, integrity, authentication, and 
nonrepudiation. 
 Many wireless networks are extensions of preexisting wired networks installed for 
the convenience of users.  With this topology, the central access point is a large 
vulnerability, possibly being a single point of failure for the wireless portion of the 
network.  While these wireless extended networks suffer from this weakness, ad hoc 
wireless networks do not.  Being distributed in nature, these networks can often survive 
when a single node is brought down.  This distribution of control helps ensure the 
survivability of the network.   
 Finally, the composition of wireless networks tends to be dynamic, even over 
short periods of time.  Wireless networks are often implemented to give users mobility 
without losing connections.  Because of the frequency of adding and dropping nodes in 
the network’s topology, authentication becomes paramount in establishing and 
maintaining trust in the network.  All of these factors must be considered when securing a 
wireless computer network. 
2.5 Bluetooth Security Issues 
 Bluetooth enabled systems have some vulnerabilities that, if overlooked, could 
pose as a threat to the security of a piconet.  These weaknesses can be classified into 
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several categories:  eavesdropping and impersonation, location attacks, hopping attacks, 
cipher attacks, invalid states, and traffic exposure. 
2.5.1 Eavesdropping and Impersonation 
 Eavesdropping and impersonation attacks require an attacker to acquire the 
initialization key of a Bluetooth device, which is used in the encryption process.  This 
initialization key is derived from a PIN, a random number (computed from the device’s 
authentication process), and the device’s Bluetooth address (BD_ADDR).  The last two 
can be intercepted easily, because they are broadcast in the clear.  The PIN must be 
entered into both devices by their users.  The first flaw is that the PIN has a default value 
of zero.  If this is not changed, the initialization key can be easily determined and the 
link’s encryption broken. 
 This PIN crunching can be used in two ways.  In the first, an attacker must use an 
exhaustive search to guess all the possible PINs.  From this list of possible PINs, the 
attacker attempts a verification process with the guessed PIN.  This process is repeated 
until a successful verification is accomplished.  This process is called “eavesdropping on 
the key establishment process” [8].  
 In the second scenario, the attacker takes a guessed PIN and tries to initialize a 
connection with the victim device by beginning the challenge-response protocol.  Like 
the eavesdropping attack, this is repeated until a selected PIN returns a ‘correct’ response 
from the victim.  This verified PIN is used to complete the key establishment protocol.  
To counter PIN guessing, Bluetooth devices use an exponential back-off process to delay 
the time between guesses allowed.  While it may keep attacks at bay longer, it also allows 
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more time for the attacker to generate more PINs.  This is called “stealing by 
participation” [8]. 
 The link key and encryption keys are derived from the initialization key.  Because 
of this, maintaining the secrecy of the device’s PIN is essential.  Once this is discovered, 
and enemy can impersonate that device.  Having the initialization key, the attacker can 
contact other devices and acquire their links keys.  By knowing the link keys, the attacker 
can impersonate these devices.  A “man-in-the-middle” attack can be initiated by 
contacting two devices acting as one to the other.  Both devices think that they are 
communicating with one another, and that the other has initiated the contact.  
Communications between the two now pass through the attacker, who can both read it 
and change it, if desired. 
2.5.2 Location Attacks 
 Bluetooth devices that are in discovery mode respond to other devices with their 
Bluetooth address (BD_ADDR).  Knowing this, an attacker can determine both the 
current location and the movements of a victim device.  If the identity of the owner of the 
Bluetooth device is known, that connection can be used to track the owner.  Because the 
BD_ADDR is an address permanently imprinted at the time of manufacturing, tracking a 
device and its associations cannot be prevented.   
 Changing power modes by a Bluetooth device can be controlled by the 
application layer of a device.  Thus, malicious software can force a device into low power 
modes that scan for other devices in its area.  The victim of such an attack will announce 
its presence which the attacker can track. 
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2.5.3 Hopping Along 
 The hopping pattern a Bluetooth device follows makes it difficult for an attacker 
to intercept Bluetooth transmissions.  The attacker must either listen to all 79 channels 
simultaneously or hop along with the piconet master’s sequence.  To hop along with the 
master, an attacker must learn the pattern or the seed used to generate the hopping 
sequence.   
 The hopping sequence is determined by the clock and address of the master.  
When a device is in inquiry mode (not currently part of a piconet), the hopping sequence 
it uses is based on its own clock and a general inquiry access code which is common to 
all devices.  During inquiry, a device transmits its clock and BD_ADDR.  An attacker 
could scan the bands reserved for inquiry and eavesdrop.  When the device is connected 
(part of a piconet), the hopping sequence is determined by the master, using both the 
master’s BD_ADDR and clock.  Piconet masters transmit their BD_ADDRs and clocks 
when they page devices.  These transmissions could also be intercepted, giving the 
attacker the information necessary to follow the hopping sequence. 
2.5.4 Cipher Attacks 
 Transmissions on a Bluetooth link can be encrypted.  The basis for this encryption 
is “[an] encryption key KC, the 48-bit BD_ADDR, the master clock bits CLK26-1, and a 
128-bit RAND value” [4].  From these four inputs, four linear feedback shift registers 
(LFSR) of size 25, 31, 33, and 39 bits are initialized to compute the encryption cipher. 
 To determine the encryption key, the inputs to the four LFSRs must be known.  
“An attacker can guess the content of the registers of the three smaller LFSRs and the 
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summation register with a probability of 2-93” [8].  The contents of the largest LFSR can 
be determined from the outputs of the other LFSRs and the summation register.  The 
output from the guess is compared to the actual transmission to determine the correctness 
of the guess.  While this still a laborious process, it is considerably better than the 2128 
required to exhaustively brute force through the encryption cipher. 
2.5.5 Invalid States 
 The Bluetooth model has to guard against being caught in one of several possible 
invalid states found in various levels of the device.  The link controller of a Bluetooth 
device can be in one of nine different states: one of two high level states or one of seven 
transitional states, as seen in Figure 5 [6]. 
 
Figure 5.  Link controller state diagram [6] 
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The two high level states can be determined by a single bit with no possible invalid 
states.  However, three bits are needed to represent the seven transitional states.  This 
leaves one state that needs to be guarded against.  A manufacturer’s design should be able 
to safely escape this state into a stable one to prevent unknown activity. 
 There are four possible states for the encryption of traffic.  Hardware needs to 
avoid going into the invalid state of encrypted broadcast traffic and unencrypted unicast 
traffic.  This would allow an outside device to listen to directed traffic while broadcast 
traffic is unavailable.  The issue is not the encrypted broadcast data, but the availability of 
unicast data while some encryption is being used. 
2.5.6 Traffic Exposure Issues 
 Data can be exposed to unauthorized parties when a slave and a master negotiate 
to change roles.  This transfer time can leave data available to unwanted recipients, or 
even lost.  If the master disables encryption during the switch, either traffic from the 
slave could be encrypted and received by no one, or unencrypted and readable by 
everyone.  Either situation leaves the data in a situation not desired at the beginning of 
the transmission [6]. 
 The link key scheme used by Bluetooth can also pose an exposure problem.  The 
problem is illustrated in Figure 6.  Device A uses its link as the basis for encryption for 
data passed between A and B.  Device A uses that same link key to encrypt traffic 
between A and C.  B can now listen to C’s traffic, and even pose as C if it chose to do so 
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[16].  The solution is for A to have a better key management system, but this grows in  
complexity with the size of the piconet (or even worse for a scatternet). 
 
Figure 6.  Link key traffic interception [6] 
2.6 Summary 
 This chapter reviewed the topics necessary for understanding of Bluetooth 
wireless systems.  First, wireless communications and the IEEE family of specifications 
governing it were discussed.  Second, Bluetooth communications and its implementation 
were presented in detail.  Third, security concerns in wireless communications were 
discussed.  Finally, security vulnerabilities specific to Bluetooth systems were outlined.  
The next chapter presents the experimental methodology.   
© 
'©^^ © 
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3.  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the methods in the experiment, as well as how the data is 
collected and analyzed.  This methodology parallels the work of Capt Tim Kneeland [11].  
Doing this serves as both a validation of his work and extensions to that work, to further 
understand Bluetooth systems. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
The purpose of this study is to determine the effective range of Bluetooth wireless 
networks in an open air environment.  This experiment evaluates several Bluetooth 
devices at various ranges and orientations to determine this distance. 
3.2.1 Goals 
 This study develops a generic usability “map” for Bluetooth enabled systems.  
This map, similar to a physical topological map, identifies the maximum range of a 
Bluetooth transmitter-receiver pair.  This not only indicates the maximum usable distance 
between the devices, but also the range at which the devices are vulnerable to 
interception.   
3.2.2 Approach 
 The map is constructed by measuring the throughput capacity of pairs of various 
vendors’ Bluetooth antennas.  A systematic combination of several different vendor 
antennas, with throughput measured at various ranges and antenna orientations are used 
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to accumulate data on the capabilities of Bluetooth transceivers.  The transmitting 
antenna, receiving antenna, distance between the two, and relative antenna orientation are 
varied.  The data gathered from this sample of unmodified commercially available 
Bluetooth transceivers is used to infer the performance of Bluetooth systems as a whole. 
3.3 System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Bluetooth channel, from transmitting 
antenna to receiving antenna, including the radio waves themselves.  Within this system, 
the packets submitted to the Bluetooth protocol stack constitute the load offered to the 
system.  All other components are either inputs or support elements to the SUT. 
 Within this SUT, the component under test (CUT) is the transmission capability 
of the transmitting antenna.  The distance at which the Bluetooth antenna is able to 
transmit defines its usability/vulnerability range. 
 This experiment is designed to infer a maximum range at which two Bluetooth 
devices can communicate and are vulnerable to interception.  The resulting distances are 
the best case for a piconet’s transmissions.  The addition of more devices to the piconet 
or the addition of barriers (as would be found in an office setting) will decrease the 
maximum range capability of the Bluetooth device. 
3.4 System Services 
 The system provides the capability to transmit data wirelessly between two nodes.  
The system provides a successful transmission if the data is received with no errors, or if 
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the errors are correctable by the receiver.  The system fails if either there is no data 
received or if there are errors that the receiver cannot.   
 Only successful trials of the system are considered in the data.  A failure of the 
system is of no use in this study, with one exception.  The failure that represents the 
antenna pair’s inability to communicate over that distance or further is noted as that 
antenna pair’s maximum distance. 
3.5 Performance Metrics 
 The performance metric used to evaluate the system is throughput.  Throughput, 
defined as the number of bits transmitted divided by the measurement period, measures 
the ability of the SUT to transmit data across the link.  The amount of data successfully 
(errorless or corrected errors) transmitted per unit time is throughput.  A failure of the 
system is identified by an unusually low throughput (high number of uncorrectable 
errors) or a zero throughput. 
3.6 Parameters 
 This section describes the parameters involved in the experiment, both for the 
system and the workload. 
3.6.1 System Parameters 
o Antenna orientation – The radiation pattern of an antenna is not omni-
directional, but varies according to the position of the receiver.  Thus, the 
distance at which a signal is receivable will be affected by the position of 
the respective antennas. 
o Antenna types – Different vendor antenna configurations are likely to produce 
variations in the performance of the Bluetooth link.  The antenna shape, 
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encasing, and manufacturing could all affect the device’s transmission 
capabilities. 
o Distance – The distance between antennas will affect the throughput of the 
wireless system.  With the power level fixed at 1 mW, there is a finite 
distance at which the signal is receivable.  The strength and reliability of a 
wireless signal decreases proportionally to this distance. 
o EM interference –Bluetooth devices operate in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz band.  
There are many other devices operating within these same frequencies and 
these devices could create scrambling or destructive interference of the 
Bluetooth signal.  Errors caused by these transmissions will decrease the 
throughput of the Bluetooth transmission. 
o Environmental Factors – Variations in barometric pressure, humidity, 
temperature, and other environmental factors can affect the Bluetooth 
signal by causing attenuation, path loss, or reflection of the signal. 
3.6.2 Workload Parameters 
o Packet Type – The antennas used in [11] came with software that conditioned 
the packet stream to use DM5 packets almost exclusively in their 
transmissions, through file transfer software included as part of the 
installation.  Not all manufacturers use this software; most manufacturers 
force the use of Windows Explorer® to execute the transmissions.  These 
signals vary in packet type, from DM1 to DH5 based upon the signal 
strength. 
 
3.7 Factors 
o Antenna orientation - (360, 90, 180, 270 degrees) – The levels for the antenna 
orientation were selected to cover 360 degrees around the transceiver.  
These levels are consistent with the previous work in [11].  The gain of 
most antennas is not uniform; therefore the antennas’ orientation is 
expected to be a significant factor in the usable range of the device.  The 
orientations of the two laptops relative to one another, along with the 
rotations of the transmitter, are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  Transmitter/Receiver Laptop Orientations 
 
o Distance – (five meter increments, one meter fine-tunings) – The five meter 
increments allow the expected range to be traversed rather quickly.  The 
one meter refinements better define where the throughput levels pass 
certain thresholds (300, 200, 100 kbps, and failure).  Due to path loss and 
signal attenuation, the distance between the two devices is expected to 
account for the largest percentage of variation in the experiment. 
o Vendor Antennas – The different antennas represent a sample of the Bluetooth 
transceivers available commercially.  The number of different devices 
generalizes these results to most Bluetooth devices.  It is suspected that the 
device manufacturing has an effect upon the system’s throughput 
capabilities and range.  Specific details concerning the antennas used can 
be found in Appendix A. 
 
The remaining parameters (possible electromagnetic interference and 
environmental-related factors) not varied are held as close to constant as possible.  Being 
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environmental factors, they cannot truly be held constant without facilities well beyond 
the scope of this study.  An effort is made to perform testing in conditions as close to 
constant as possible.  It is expected that some of the resulting error is attributable to these 
environmental parameters. 
3.8. Evaluation Technique 
The evaluation technique used for this experiment is a direct measurement of the 
system.  This evaluation technique is selected for several reasons.  Since the true effect of 
the factors on the system’s performance is unknown, a valid simulator for Bluetooth 
networks is unavailable.  Direct measurement of a Bluetooth system correlates the factors 
to the performance metrics.  This method is also valid because it is the best case scenario 
of an implemented Bluetooth network, which is the focus of this study. 
3.9 Workload 
 The workload offered to the system is a 1000 KB text file.  This has several 
advantages.  The first is the ease of throughput calculations given a file of this size.  This 
also allows the transfer to run long enough to achieve reliable results for the throughput 
measurement.  The minimum amount of time needed to transmit the file is 
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 seconds, using solely DH5 packets.  As the packet type varies, 
so will the best case throughput.  As seen in Table 2, one-way throughput is highly 
dependent upon the packet type chosen by the transmitter.  The best possible case 
throughput uses DH5 packets.  This time represents the minimum necessary for a file to 
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be transmitted, and many of the trials are expected to take longer as the signal degrades.  
This workload is applied until the file transmission is complete.  
3.10 Experimental Design 
 The experimental design for the throughput tests is a three factor, full factorial 
design with replications.  A full factorial design with replications means the effect of 
each factor, effect of the interactions, and the effect due to experimental error can be 
separated from one another and be quantified.  The number of trials for each orientation 
is variable, because each orientation is likely to fail at different distances.  The best result 
is chosen from r iterations of experiment, to find the maximum range at which 
throughput level can be attained. 
 While the best case range is of primary interest, the mean of these replications is 
of interest to determine the statistical significance at each distance and orientation.  
Assuming a normal distribution of error and a 95% confidence (z = 1.645, α = 5), the 
number of replications, r, required is given by 2)
5
5.164(
x
sr =  [17], where s is the sample 
standard deviation and x  is the mean of the sample.  Each experiment is initially 
performed three times.  From this sample, r is calculated and more replications are run 
until the desired confidence interval width is reached.   
3.11 Experimental Setup 
 For each experiment, two laptops were arranged on wooden stools (0.6318 meters 
tall) in the orientations shown in Figure 7.  A wooden stool was used to minimize 
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possible interference that metal stools may have produced.  The distance between the 
laptops is measured and fixed for each experiment. 
 For each distance-orientation pair, the test file is transmitted at least three times.  
The packet level traffic for each successful transmission is captured by the CATC Merlin 
Protocol Analyzer [5].  This transmission sequence is analyzed to determine the 
throughput for the file transfer. 
3.12 Results Analysis and Interpretation 
 The percentage that each factor contributes to the throughput can be determined 
from the data using analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The mean square of each effect 
(MSx) is calculated from its sum of squares (SSx) and its degrees of freedom (vx).  The 
mean square of the error (MSE) is calculated the same way.  The ratio of the two 
(MSx/MSE) is the computed F-value.  If this value is greater than the F curve defined by 
F(0.95, vx, ve), then factor x is significantly different than the error [7].  As mentioned 
above, the number of replications will be increased to ensure significance between levels 
of the experiment. 
3.13 Summary 
This chapter discussed the experimental methodology for testing the best case 
usable distance between two Bluetooth wireless devices.  The goals and approach used in 
this experiment were presented, followed by a definition of the system and component 
under test.  Next, a discussion of the parameters and factors varied in the experiment is 
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given.  This is followed by a definition of the workload and experimental methodology.  
Finally, a description of the data analysis is presented.   
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4.  Analysis and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results from the throughput experiments performed on 
each of the antennas, as well as analysis of the data collected.  This data is first 
generalized to each of the two general antenna types (PC Card and USB Dongle).  Details 
of each individual antenna are then presented. 
For all tests, a Dell Inspiron 8200 running Windows 2000 is the transmitting 
device.  When facing this laptop, the PC cards extend from the right hand side of the 
keyboard.  The USB dongle extends from the back of the laptop, on the left hand side.  
The receiving device is a Dell Latitude D600, also running Windows 2000.  In this 
laptop, the PC card extends from the left hand side of the keyboard.  The USB dongles 
extend from the back of the laptop, on the right hand edge. 
The throughput levels are calculated by finding the time stamp on the first packet 
containing information from the test file, as well as the last.  The size of the file is known, 
so the throughput is determined by simply dividing that size by the difference in time 
stamps of the last and first packets.  The throughput calculator within Merlin is not used 
since it does not account for retransmissions of packets. 
Throughput measurements are only performed out to 40 meters; a physical 
limitation of the indoor testing environment.  Any cards whose thresholds for various 
throughput values exceeded this distance are noted in the analysis, but those lines are not 
shown in the maps presented. 
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4.2 Antenna Types 
4.2.1 PC Cards 
 As a group, the PC cards performed quite similar to one another.  Despite this 
similarity, the 3Com PC card performed the best.  This may be due to the unique physical 
design of the 3Com antenna, which folds out of the plane of the card itself.  However, the 
performance cannot be completely attributed to this physical difference, as the Belkin PC 
card (which does not have this antenna feature) performed almost as well as than the 
3Com antenna.  Both were able to transmit out to 40 meters, with 3Com’s performance 
better at that distance.  The Anycom antenna performed close to these two, but only had 
one orientation (360 degrees) that transmitted at 40 meters.  The other orientations failed 
beyond 35 meters. 
The amount of variance attributed to the manufacturer was only 0.1386%, and 
that was only significant to a 60% confidence.  The majority of the variance was 
attributed to the distance (78.81%) and to the interaction between the distance and the 
manufacturer (11.00%).  The orientation of the antenna only affected the variance when 
combined with the manufacturer and distance, and it was only 9.00% at that. 
4.2.1.1 3Com PC Card 
 The 3Com PC card has an unusual feature; an antenna that flips up out of the 
plane of the card itself.  It is possible that this feature is what contributed to the card’s 
ability to transmit at over 100 kbps beyond 40 meters, the largest distance tested.  Its 
transmission failure range is therefore unknown.  The effect of the antenna extending to a 
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different plane than the other PC cards could be determined by running more tests, some 
where the antenna is extended and some where it is not. 
 The 90 degree orientation is the best at the 200 kbps level, successfully achieving 
that throughput at 20 meters.  The 270 degree orientation is the best at the 100 kbps, with 
a distance of at least 40 meters.  The specific data for each device can be found in 
Appendix A.  For the 3Com PC card alone, the distance between the devices was the 
most significant factors, accounting for 84.5% of the variation.  The interaction of the 
distance and orientation accounts for 6.3%, while the orientation alone accounts for 3.7%.  
Figure 8 below shows a graphical throughput representation for the different orientations. 
 
Figure 8.  3Com PC Card throughput ranges 
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4.2.1.2 Anycom PC Card 
 The Anycom PC card comes with a different software set than used by the other 
devices in this study.  The file transfer software preconditions the packet stream for 
transmission.  As a result, all the data packets broadcast have the DM5 packet type.  This 
could affect the throughput levels because both the data block size and error correction 
level of this type packets are fixed.  The distance at which the Anycom cards can 
successfully broadcast is shorter than the other two PC card antennas.  Perhaps the 
retransmission of large blocks of data is the contributing factor, given that the number of 
packets with errors increases as the distance between the devices increases.  Because the 
file transfer software for this card forces the data packets to be DM5s, this hypothesis 
cannot be tested without modifications to the software. 
 As shown in Figure 9, the 90 degree orientation is best at both the 300 and 100 
kbps levels, producing ranges for each out to 10 and 30 meters, respectively.  The 360 
degree orientation is the best at the 200 kbps and failure levels.  The 200 kbps level is 
possible at 25 meters, while the orientation fails out beyond 40 meters.  Again, the 
distance between the devices is the dominating effect, causing 91.5% of the variation.  
The interaction between the distance and orientation accounts for 7.1% of the change, 
while the orientation alone accounts for less than one percent. 
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Figure 9.   Anycom PC Card throughput ranges 
4.2.1.3 Belkin PC Card 
 As shown in Figure 10 below, the 180 degree orientation is just slightly (less than 
1 kbps) better than the 90 degree orientation, achieving the 300 kbps level at 10 meters.  
The 300 kbps line is flat for the 270 and 360 degree orientations because the antenna did 
not achieve throughputs of 300 kbps at any distance measured for those orientations.  
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This same anomaly occurs in the 3Com USB dongle’s map.  The 360 degree orientation 
is the best for the 200 and 100 kbps levels, transmitting at those levels at 25 and 30 
meters, respectively.  All orientations transmitted beyond the 40 meter mark, with the 90 
degree orientation having the highest throughput at that distance.  Similar to the 3Com 
antenna, the true failure distance is not known.  Like the other two PC cards, the distance 
between the Belkin cards is the greatest contributor to the variation, accounting for 89.5% 
of it.  Likewise the distance-orientation interaction and orientation itself followed suit, 
with allocations of 7.5% and 2.5%, respectively. 
 
Figure 10.  Belkin PC Card throughput ranges 
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4.2.2 USB Dongles 
 Unlike the PC cards, the USB dongles did not perform similarly to one another.  
There is a great difference between the top performer (Hawking) and the bottom 
performer (DLink).  Some of this difference is likely attributable to the size of the 
dongles themselves, as the DLink antenna is considerably smaller than any of the other 
devices tested.  The differences between the cards are easily distinguishable.  The 
Hawking card is capable of over 200 kbps at 40 meters.  The second best dongle (3Com) 
is capable of over 100 kbps at 40 meters.  The Belkin device failed beyond 25 meters, 
and the DLink antenna was barely usable at 10 meters. 
In fact, the manufacturer accounted for the majority of the variance (57.36%) in 
the USB group.  After that, the variance ranks were comparable to the PC cards, with 
distance accounting for 22.87%, the manufacturer-distance combination accounting for 
9.76%, and the orientation-manufacturer-distance grouping combining for just 7.67% of 
the variation.  
4.2.2.1 3Com USB Dongle 
 The 360 orientation is slightly better than the 90 degree orientation for the 300 
kbps level, both achieving it up to 11 meters (see Figure 11).  The 270 degree orientation 
is also slightly better than the 180 degree orientation at the 200 kbps level, with both 
producing those results at 25 meters.  All of the orientations are able to transmit above 
100 kbps beyond 40 meters, so the distance to failure is unknown.  The majority (73.6%) 
of the variance comes from the distance between the devices.  The distance interacting 
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with the orientation accounts for 13.9% of the variation, while the orientation alone is 
again inconsequential, contributing to a miniscule 0.1835% of the change. 
 
Figure 11.  3Com USB throughput ranges 
4.2.2.2 Belkin USB Dongle 
 The 270 degree orientation, as shown in Figure 12, is the best here at the 300 kbps 
level, producing that throughput at 15 meters.  It also dominates the 200 and 100 kbps 
levels, achieving each at 19 and 25 meters respectively.  All of the orientations failed at 
30 meters.  The distance is slightly less of a factor, although still a considerable one, 
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accounting for 64.7% of the variation in the Belkin USB dongle.  The distance-
orientation interaction increased to fill that void, providing 27.4% of the variation. 
 
Figure 12.  Belkin USB throughput ranges 
4.2.2.3 DLink USB Dongle 
 The relatively abysmal performance (shown in Figure 13) of the DLink antenna is 
probably linked to the size of the device.  The smallest of all the antennas, it is at least 
half the size of the rest of the USB devices.  With this small antenna, the gain patterns for 
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both transmitting and receiving are diminished.  This is likely the reason it was unable to 
transmit above 100 kbps, and why only one of the four orientations was successful 
beyond 15 meters.  If DLink were to create a similar card, with only the antenna size 
changed, then this hypothesis could be tested. 
 The DLink card is unable to achieve throughputs of over 100 kbps at any distance 
measured.  The only orientation of note is the 360 degree orientation, which has a usable 
signal out to 18 meters, whereas the other three orientations failed after 10 meters.  
Again, the distance between the devices accounted for the majority of the variation 
(74.1%).  The distance-orientation interaction accounts for 17.5% of the variation, with 
the orientation alone having no significant effect at all on the throughput. 
 
Figure 13.  DLink USB throughput ranges 
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4.2.2.4 Hawking USB Dongle 
 Figure 14 reflects the throughput performance of this device.  The 90 degree 
orientation is slightly better than the 270 degree orientation, both achieving the 300 kbps 
level at 24 meters.  The 180 degree orientation is the only one not to transmit at the 200 
kbps level at 40 meters.  All four orientations are capable of at least 100 kbps beyond that 
distance; therefore the failure distance is unknown.  For the Hawking antenna, 76.6 % of 
the variation is attributable to the distance between the devices.  The interaction between 
the distance and orientation accounts for another 14.3% of the change.  Again, the 
orientation alone has no effect on the variability.   
 
Figure 14.  Hawking USB throughput ranges 
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4.3 Summary 
 This chapter presented the capabilities of seven different Bluetooth devices, 
giving both the results of the experiments and an explanation for those results.  From 
these tests, it is shown that while performance does vary by manufacturer and antenna 
type, Bluetooth is capable of over 100 kbps at distances greater than 40 meters.  The PC 
cards all preformed similarly, likely due to nearly identical size and manufacturing.  The 
USB dongles varied considerably in performance, likely due to the same manufacturing 
differences.  The larger dongles performed better while the smallest dongle (DLink) had 
the worst capability. 
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5.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter concludes the research presented in this thesis.  A discussion of the 
outcome of each research objective is given.  This is followed by recommendations for 
future work and a summary of the research. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
In developing these usability/vulnerability maps, it is found that for any given 
antenna, the distance between devices accounts for the greatest percentage of variation.  
This variation falls anywhere between roughly 60-90%.  The manufacturing of the device 
also plays a significant role, as capabilities varied widely between all seven antennas 
tested. 
Given that orientation by itself did not prove to be a significant factor for any of 
the devices, the usability/vulnerability range of Bluetooth devices appears to be based 
upon the distance from the transmitter.  In some of these 1 mW devices, a throughput of 
over 100 kbps is attainable at distances exceeding 40 meters.  This is much greater than 
the 10 meter range stated within the Bluetooth specification and advertised by the 
manufacturers themselves.  Further study of higher power devices may prove this range 
to be even greater than reported here. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research accomplished an introductory study into the capabilities of 
commercially available Bluetooth devices, with their capabilities measured by the 
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throughput attainable at various distances and orientations.  Possible further research 
topics in Bluetooth are: 
o Full factorial analysis of antenna orientations, varying both the transmitter and 
the receiver positions. 
o Heterogeneous pairing of antennas to determine if any variance can be 
attributed to transmitter/receiver differences. 
o Performance evaluation of higher power ( > 1 mW) Bluetooth devices 
o Performance evaluation of Bluetooth access points 
o Evaluation of Bluetooth enabled handheld devices (e.g. PDAs) 
5.4 Summary 
This research determined a usability/vulnerability range for seven commercially 
available Bluetooth devices.  This information was derived from experiments varying the 
distance between and orientation of two Bluetooth antennas.  These throughput maps 
provide a first step towards understanding the requirements for implementing a Bluetooth 
network in a secure environment, as well as laying a foundation for other research in this 
topic area.  
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Appendix A – Antenna specifics 
 This appendix contains the throughput tables and ANOVA charts for each of the 
antennas used in the experiment.  The hardware details applicable to each antenna are 
also provided. 
 The ANOVA analysis for each card was limited to the distances at which 
measurements from each orientation were taken.  A more precise analysis of variation 
could be possible if every orientation is measured at every distance. 
1. 3Com PC Card 
 The 3Com PC card is operating on version 1.2.0.0 of its Bluetooth software. 
Table 3.  3Com PC Card Best Case Throughput Data 
      
Orientation 
(degrees)   
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5   258.1503 259.3842 240.1674 245.3112 
8  X X X 209.9062 
9  X X X 205.6365 
10  215.1285 240.8295 210.3961 211.5306 
11  202.7748 X 195.5795 X 
12  213.21 X 130.6046 X 
15  152.0778 207.2215 160.4184 194.6324 
16  X 192.9869 X X 
17  X 184.4927 X X 
20  181.8778 236.2174 115.7557 138.0750 
25  161.7305 166.3749 114.0644 189.4269 
30  145.1024 142.3006 133.5164 147.7197 
35  104.6987 128.3680 101.6306 105.1203 
40   89.4002 94.8932 98.0957 121.4639 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
Table 4.  3Com PC Card ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 7 204496.5 29213.8 42.6207 <.0001 
Orient 3 9568.093 3189.36 4.6530 0.0120 
Distance*Orient 21 14394.16 685.436 4.4410 <.0001 
Within 64 9877.915 154.342   
Total 95 238336.7 2508.81   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 2377.3630 84.511 48.758
Orient 104.3303 3.7088 10.214
Distance*Orient 177.0313 6.2932 13.305
Within 154.3424 5.4866 12.423
Total 2813.0671 100 53.038
 
 
2. Anycom PC Card 
 The Anycom PC card is configured as follows: 
Table 5.  Anycom PC Card Configuration 
 
Installation Package 
--------------------------------------------- 
System Release 2.14.221.31 
 
Applications 
--------------------------------------------- 
Bluetooth Wizard   - Version: 2.0.0.15 
Bluetooth FileTransfer  - Version: 2.0.0.18 
Bluetooth PhoneControl  - Version: 2.0.0.18 
SppBridge.exe   - Version: 2.0.0.33 
Bluetooth Printing   - Version: 2.0.0.22 
 
Libraries 
--------------------------------------------- 
hci.dll    - Version: 2.0.0.27 
l2cap.dll    - Version: 2.0.0.7 
obex.dll    - Version: 2.0.0.10 
phonecontrol.dll   - Version: 2.0.0.2 
redmonnt.dll    - Version: 1.72.00 
rfcomm.dll    - Version: 2.0.0.4 
sdp.dll    - Version: 2.0.0.9 
wssbt.cpl    - Version: 2.0.0.6 
 
Other 
--------------------------------------------- 
Serial Port Emulator (wss_spp.sys) 2.0.0.18 
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Table 6.  Anycom PC Card Best Case Throughput Data 
      Orientation   
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5   310.8796 312.2726 312.1685 311.7526 
6  243.007 X 245.0786 258.2878 
7  226.6161 X 230.897 236.9687 
8  283.7363 X 222.6044 248.3123 
9  285.868 X 244.7045 292.2025 
10  298.609 308.6682 278.9408 298.6771 
11  X 297.8212 272.6598 X 
12  X 282.7078 187.6801 X 
13  X 290.7888 265.5105 X 
14  X 268.0415 237.3033 X 
15  299.3483 281.0703 213.6675 257.0111 
18  294.4746 239.6208 X X 
19  242.3778 241.0136 X X 
20  161.1558 195.0714 148.5022 260.1855 
21  X X X 227.4422 
22  X X X 211.3651 
23  X X X 204.0767 
24  X X X 188.1176 
25  202.8758 183.8906 157.4685 167.4626 
26  X X 89.51811 140.4961 
27  X X 135.6525 141.3022 
28  151.4826 X X 152.0628 
29  147.3432 X X 121.2315 
30  82.56734 152.3633 34.64043 100.1096 
31  X 68.4913 X X 
32  X 62.1363 X X 
33  X 43.3275 X X 
34  X 49.787 X X 
35  53.27135 45.02945 80.86837 82.51223 
40   39.58544 Fail Fail Fail 
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Table 7.  Anycom PC Card ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 7 1037623 148232 51.1523 <.0001 
Orient 3 17084.15 5694.72 1.9651 0.1501 
Distance*Orient 21 60854.95 2897.85 45.8714 <.0001 
Within 64 4043.098 63.1734   
Total 95 1119606 11785.3   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 12111.172 91.5 110.05
Orient 116.536 0.8805 10.80
Distance*Orient 944.894 7.1 30.74
Within 63.173 0.4773 7.95
Total 13235.775 100.0 115.05
 
3. Belkin PC Card 
 The Belkin PC card operates on Bluetooth software version 1.2.1 and in the 
following hardware configuration: 
 
Figure 15.  Belkin PC Card hardware configuration 
 
Bluetooth Conriguratlon ■JIM 
General      | 
Local Services 
Accessibility      I      DIsccvery      |      I nfcrmatlcn Exchange 
ClientAppllcallcns       Hardware   I  Verslcninfc  I   Nctlflcatlcns 
Devices: 
^ 
1^ 
Name 
Belkin CardBus Bluetccth Dcngle 
Type 
PCMCIA 
rUevice Hcperties 1 
Manufacturer: Cambridge Silicon Radio 
Firmware Revision:    Version 115 
Device Status This device Is working properly 
Device Address:   00:05:4E:00:E3:AA 
HCI Version: Bluetooth HCIl.l 
HCI Revision: 0073 
LMP Version: Bluetooth LMP 1.1 
LMP Subversion:    0073 
Advanced 
OK Cancel Help 
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Table 8.  Belkin PC Card Best Case Throughput Data 
      Orientation   
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5   295.1521 310.3502 304.6213 267.5716 
10  283.6143 314.0172 314.4766 295.8986 
15  290.7248 290.107 220.3812 219.2306 
16  X X 197.3695 210.6383 
17  X X 153.8683 204.3826 
18  X X 107.0329 189.7001 
19  X X X 188.1151 
20  262.6608 233.1074 141.6721 199.9294 
21  X 64.4844 X X 
22  X 100.0395 X X 
23  X 122.6503 X X 
24  X 95.4178 X X 
25  218.9668 199.3818 150.3807 213.6679 
26  123.3546 X X 121.5646 
27  93.71719 X X 121.3193 
28  121.9789 X X X 
29  111.8363 X X X 
30  181.4162 124.5304 107.3609 156.5348 
35  72.176 86.2525 69.2656 58.939 
40   65.7258 84.0386 43.6911 70.8047 
 
Table 9.  Belkin PC Card ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 7 719774.9 102825 47.8435 <.0001 
Orient 3 23652.7 7884.23 3.6685 0.0287 
Distance*Orient 21 45133.13 2149.2 46.5930 <.0001 
Within 64 2952.128 46.127   
Total 95 791512.9 8331.71   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 8389.6492 89.482 91.595
Orient 238.9599 2.5487 15.458
Distance*Orient 701.0232 7.477 26.477
Within 46.1270 0.492 6.792
Total 9375.7592 100 96.829
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4.  3Com USB 
The 3Com PC card is operating on version 1.2.0.0 of its Bluetooth software. 
Table 10.  3Com USB Best Case Throughput Data 
      Orientation   
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5   302.3882 309.2684 310.5731 278.1970 
10  334.5866 300.4192 223.5487 273.4480 
11  X X 230.6585 251.3958 
12  X X 226.7077 221.0531 
13  X X X 211.3359 
14  X X X 223.9413 
15  230.1000 258.1378 192.1216 173.8494 
16  X 217.2722 X X 
17  X 209.5633 X X 
18  X 226.4022 X X 
19  X 207.4284 X X 
20  246.0953 238.9243 174.3963 175.8757 
25  195.4834 198.7569 223.8112 254.7388 
30  152.5373 186.9703 181.8987 173.0351 
35  178.2483 169.5994 168.7867 138.1850 
40   144.0456 141.5424 160.3589 130.9853 
 
Table 11.  3Com USB ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 7 218214.8 31173.5 17.3425 <.0001 
Orient 3 5831.998 1944 1.0815 0.3785 
Distance*Orient 21 37747.97 1797.52 4.3807 <.0001 
Within 64 26260.71 410.324   
Total 95 288055.5 3032.16   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 2448.0019 73.6 49.477
Orient 6.1032 0.1835 2.470
Distance*Orient 462.3996 13.9 21.503
Within 410.3236 12.3 20.256
Total 3326.8283 100.0 57.679
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5.  Belkin USB 
 The Belkin USB dongle operates on Bluetooth software version 1.3.2.7 and in the 
following hardware configuration: 
 
Figure 16.  Belkin USB hardware configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bluetoolti CdiiAguralian 
Genadl AccessU^ | Discoveqi | Locd Seivices | denlAppfcabons   Haichvae 
Devices: 
Hm JH* 
^Bekn Bhetoolh USB Device USB 
- Device Piopeilies  
Device Slabjs: The selected device is woikrig piopeili'. 
Maniactuer CaiJdidge Sicon Ratio 
Fimwaie Revision Vei9cin525 
Device Adihess: 00:02:72:40:3F:DB 
HGVeisiDn: BluetoolhHai.1 
HG Revision 020D 
LMPVeision BluetoolhLMP1.1 
LMPSiiiVeision 020D 
OK Catcd Applv Het 
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Table 12.  Belkin USB Best Case Throughput Data 
      Orientation   
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5   299.4144 284.1751 337.0626 318.126 
6  160.7332 301.1576 292.4248 X 
7  259.321 284.2957 353.5038 X 
8  154.8998 253.4432 378.1153 X 
9  128.4706 332.7004 313.6787 X 
10  164.645 362.6563 536.5242 277.0843 
11  243.8308 313.6036 335.2519 X 
12  121.2005 259.1673 271.9598 X 
13  87.8603 238.8874 234.9804 X 
14  90.4601 205.1956 113.5302 X 
15  55.03324 135.325 147.0657 307.0196 
16  X 118.8457 122.6434 227.9333 
17  X 126.0265 59.5839 259.1159 
18  X 76.1473 65.8017 196.2228 
19  X 81.3496 81.4264 269.2253 
20  33.79304 53.02871 32.41432 43.97504 
25  18.61885 25.03195 47.46183 173.7474 
30   Fail Fail Fail Fail 
 
Table 13.  Belkin USB ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 4 752701.8 188175 10.0411 0.0008 
Orient 3 97821.12 32607 1.7399 0.2120 
Distance*Orient 12 224885.2 18740.4 23.6858 <.0001 
Within 40 31648.33 791.208   
Total 59 1107056 18763.7   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 14119.584 64.7 118.83
Orient 924.440 4.2 30.40
Distance*Orient 5983.076 27.4 77.35
Within 791.208 3.6 28.13
Total 21818.309 100.0 147.71
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6.  DLink USB 
 The DLink USB dongle operates on Bluetooth software version 1.2.2.15 and in 
the following hardware configuration: 
 
Figure 17.  DLink USB hardware configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
Bluetoolti CdiiAguralian 
Genaal       | 
Local Seivices 
Devices: 
AccessiAv       |       DiscDveiy       |       Infonnabon Exchange 
denlAppfccalicini       Haichvaie    I  Vefsionlrfo   \   Notifeabons   | 
Hm Jyp?_ 
G&D-Lk^DBT-120USBBIuetoolhAd^itei USB 
^ 
-Device Piopeilies  
Maniactuer       Camfandge Sicon RaiiD 
Fimwaie Revision:    Veision 443 
Device Slabjs: This device is woikrig piopeili' 
Device Ad±ess:   00:80:C8:35:1G:1F 
HGVeision:    BhetoothMG 1.1 
HG Revision    01BB 
LMPVeision:    BluetoolhLMPI.1 
LMPSiii Veision    01 BB 
OK Catcd Met 
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Table 14.  DLink USB Best Case Throughput Data 
      Orientation     
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5   43.39152 75.79362 68.14643 66.90015 
10  60.87489 59.94364 47.82668 50.80767 
15  27.23608 Fail Fail Fail 
16  58.01765 X X X 
17  37.2099 X X X 
18   51.82118 X X X 
 
Table 15.  DLink USB ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 2 16215.24 8107.62 15.5905 0.0042 
Orient 3 173.5196 57.8399 0.1112 0.9504 
Distance*Orient 6 3120.212 520.035 7.3007 0.0002 
Within 24 1709.549 71.2312   
Total 35 21218.52 606.243   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 632.29867 74.115 25.146
Orient 0.00000 0 0.000
Distance*Orient 149.60135 17.536 12.231
Within 71.23123 8.3494 8.440
Total 853.13125 100 29.208
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7. Hawking USB 
 The Hawking USB dongle operates on Bluetooth software version 1.2.2.18 and in 
the following hardware configuration: 
 
Figure 18.  Hawking USB hardware configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Bluetooth Conliguratlon ^^^^^^^xj 
General               Acce^^ibilily               Di^coverv 
Local Services        ClienI Applicalion^        Hardware 
Inlormalion E-change 
Version Inio       Nolilicalion^ 
Devices 
Name Type 
^USB Blueloolh Device USB 
Manulaclurer        Cambridge Silicon Radio     ^| 
Firmware Revision     Version 373                        1 
1 
_        1 
Device Slalu^  Thi^ device i^ working properlv 
Device Addre^^    00 EO 98 85 DD 71 
HCI Version     Blueloolh HCI 1 1 
HCI Revision     0175 
LMPVemon     Blueloolh LMP 1 1 
LMPSubVemon     0175 " 
OK        1        Cancel Apply                  Help 
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Table 16.  Hawking USB Best Case Throughput Data 
      Orientation   
Distance 
(m)  360 90 180 270 
      
5  503.4966 352.8667 482.6861 406.5817 
10  491.7153 424.4977 500.9557 375.2075 
11  328.8407 X 338.7356 X 
12  325.9772 X 375.078 X 
13  291.3198 X 343.1358 X 
14  325.3945 X 344.3442 X 
15  273.2397 320.9302 346.4961 313.9334 
16  X 310.9543 332.935 X 
17  X 333.4773 333.6981 X 
18  X 334.6014 309.2662 X 
19  X 326.3672 321.4038 X 
20  270.644 297.2947 293.7065 316.054 
21  X X X 293.368 
22  X X X 327.362 
23  X 227.1767 X 299.8671 
24  X 329.9836 X 302.6235 
25  236.115 205.3973 179.2193 266.7687 
28  250.6789 X 258.2174 X 
29  207.0178 X 224.6431 X 
30  97.4692 225.7809 92.8612 263.6094 
35  182.2338 177.4846 257.244 229.9656 
36  X X 117.6295 224.021 
37  X X 233.0498 258.5334 
38  X X 291.1436 201.4852 
39  X X 234.9721 277.8647 
40   214.2752 244.6589 157.798 207.0786 
 
Table 17.  Hawking USB ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F 
Distance 7 723496.8 103357 18.6854 <.0001 
Orient 3 13143.24 4381.08 0.7920 0.5119 
Distance*Orient 21 116159.7 5531.42 5.6505 <.0001 
Within 64 62651.7 978.933   
Total 95 915451.5 9636.33   
Variance Components 
Component Var Component % of Total Plot% Sqrt(Var Comp)
Distance 8152.106 76.6 90.29
Orient 0.000 0.0 0.00
Distance*Orient 1517.494 14.3 38.96
Within 978.933 9.2 31.29
Total 10648.534 100.0 103.19
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Appendix B – Merlin Configuration 
The following are screenshots of the recording options in Merlin: 
 
Figure 19.  Merlin General Recording Options 
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Figure 20.  Merlin Modes Recording Options 
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Figure 21.  Merlin Events Recording Options 
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Figure 22.  Merlin Actions Recording Options 
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